Since the time of the dismantlement of the enforcement arm of Treasury and the corresponding creation of the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice officials have taken some of the highest positions at Treasury including TFI, FinCEN, and OFAC. After serving time at Treasury, many then leave for lucrative positions in the private sector.
While some think this is business as usual in Washington, I believe this incestuous relationship has serious consequences.
DOJ officials populating the Treasury management team bring DOJ's way of thinking, outlook, and methods of doing business with them. Most are attorneys. They have a misplaced faith in laws, rules, regulations, sanctions, designations and other legal and procedural maneuvers that have been increasingly employed to combat financial crimes and terror finance. This is not the space to debate the efficacy of these actions but I will say that in my opinion they have been over emphasized. Simply put, it is sometimes difficult for our legalistic policymakers to understand that much of the rest of the world does not operate by our rule of law. Our adversaries are adroit at going around legalistic “counter-measures.”
Another consequence of the DOJ influence on Treasury is that it exacerbates the Washington management syndrome of “group think.” Treasury should bring to the interagency and interdepartmental table its unique skillsets, expertise, and insights. Today, for the most part, that’s gone. The incestuous DOJ/Treasury relationship breeds the same way of looking at a problem and the same worn “solutions.”
The real kicker is that when some of these same officials leave Treasury they land jobs in the private sector, particularly the financial services industry. Why does this matter? There are ethics issues. There are appearance issues. And there are “old boy” network issues.
Earlier this year a major bank received a comparative slap on the wrist settlement for turning a blind eye and laundering billions of dollars of drug money. There were also other serious crimes. Yet not one bank official was held accountable. (Meanwhile some low-level drug users face mandatory prison sentences). The individual that played a large role in negotiating the bank settlement used to work at Justice. He then worked at Treasury at a very senior level. One-and-a-half years before the record settlement was announced, the former government official started to work at the subject bank in the office of General Counsel.
This is probably the most egregious example but it is not an isolated incident. As a proud former Treasury employee, I’m embarrassed.
Unless this kind of behavior is changed, it will continue to be business as usual. Congressional oversight committees, the concerned cabinet secretaries, and departmental chief counsels must get involved. The next steps in my seven step plan will suggest other steps to reinvigorate our "stalled" efforts to combat money laundering and terror finance.